France's Defense Renaissance: Navigating NATO Without the United States

About this paper. This analysis was originally written in spring 2025 as a policy memo to the President of France. The argument and recommendations are presented as written. Since then: at the June 2025 Hague summit, NATO allies committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035, with at least 3.5% on core defense.[20] In April 2026, France announced a revised military programming law adding €36 billion over four years and reaching roughly 2.6% of GDP by 2030.[21] As of September 2026, the Pentagon is weighing withdrawing up to 40,000 of the roughly 68,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe.[22] Together, these developments make the question this memo asks more urgent, not less.

Under President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, European nations are reevaluating their reliance on the United States for security. Without U.S. support, NATO would be more exposed to external threats: Russian expansionism following the invasion of Ukraine, growing strategic competition from China, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and disinformation campaigns made easier by artificial intelligence. A U.S. withdrawal from NATO would weaken the collective defense network that has ensured European stability for decades, leaving France more exposed to both traditional military threats and non-traditional ones such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and strategic coercion by rival powers.

The question: to what extent can France absorb the economic and military burden of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO?

The stakes for France are high. A weakened NATO would undermine the credibility of France’s defense posture in Europe and increase direct risks to its territorial security, economic stability, and political influence. France’s long-term objective of strategic autonomy depends on a functioning collective defense system, which makes this challenge central to its national interest.

France’s case for leadership

France has steadily pursued a self-reliant defense policy since President Emmanuel Macron took office in 2017. Its 2017 Defense and National Security Strategic Review states that strategic autonomy remains a key objective because of its decisive impact on sovereignty and freedom of action, and calls that autonomy a condition of France’s credibility with its allies and partners.[1] The emphasis signals France’s intent to keep control over its own security decisions without depending on an external power such as the United States.

In line with its vision of strong collective security, France has positioned itself as a dependable ally that can unite Europe around shared security goals. It has favored small, “mini-lateral” groupings of capable European states built from the bottom up, most notably the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which brings together willing and able European nations to improve military interoperability and the ability to conduct interventions.[2] EI2 is central to France’s strategic autonomy: cooperation with other European countries aims to build a defense network that can operate effectively without outside support.

France has also been active in European defense in practice. Beyond operations against jihadist groups, French troops have deployed to the Baltics under NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence since 2017, including to Lithuania in 2018. The commitment was modest (three hundred troops, four Leclerc main battle tanks, and thirteen armored personnel carriers), but it demonstrates France’s capability and reinforces its ties to NATO.[3]

In military terms, France has the advantage of being, like the United States, a nuclear power, and it is the only nuclear power in the European Union. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council with strong bilateral ties to London, Washington, and Berlin, France holds a central position in the European security architecture.[4] That combination gives it outsized influence over EU defense policy.

Macron’s vision is a unified Europe able to compete with China, Russia, and the United States, with trade, defense, and social policies capable of protecting European citizens in a world defined by major powers, and a Europe that amplifies the power and sovereignty of its smaller states.[5] A push for a more capable Europe will reshape how the EU and NATO operate and will demand more from every member, even though France itself is willing to contribute heavily.

Why France, and why not others

Given the threat of Russian expansion, France should take a leadership role in NATO, because its goal of a more independent Europe depends on a strong NATO partnership. Unlike some partners, France has shown the political will to lead. For different reasons, Germany and Türkiye are reluctant to take roles that put them at the front of military action, while the more interventionist France and Britain have faced austerity-driven strategic retrenchment.[6] The hesitance of other members to invest directly in NATO defense would eventually place a heavy burden on France. Burden-sharing has long been one of NATO’s central disputes, alongside the question of U.S. withdrawal.

France cannot build a strong NATO alone. The burden-sharing debate, disagreements over eastern versus southern priorities, and tensions around the INF Treaty all show sources of friction that have little to do with the EU agenda.[7] Some members prioritize other issues over European security, and others are reluctant to contribute militarily because of their own history in the region.

Türkiye is one member that has looked elsewhere for its security, raising tensions with other allies. As relations with NATO and the EU have soured, Ankara has moved closer to the China- and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, even though Türkiye remains strategically important to Europe and the United States on a wide range of regional security challenges.[8] Looking for security guarantees outside the alliance signals doubt about NATO’s credibility and weakens it.

Germany, for its part, prefers a diplomatic approach to European security, an attitude shared by its public and its leaders. Germany has no strong political tradition of discussing war: former president Horst Köhler felt obliged to resign in May 2010 after public uproar over his remark that German military efforts abroad were linked to German economic interests, a comment that would have passed unnoticed in the United States, Britain, or France.[9] That posture has served Germany well within NATO, but with the war in Ukraine and France’s call for a more autonomous European defense, Europe urgently needs to reduce its reliance on the United States. Germany needs to contribute more to the alliance than diplomacy.

What the United States provides

A U.S. withdrawal would pose a major challenge to France given the added burden on its economy and military. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Department of Defense deployed 20,000 additional forces to Europe, bringing the total to more than 100,000, and in fiscal year 2022 executed $3.8 billion in European Deterrence Initiative funding (with another $4.2 billion requested for FY2023) for rotational forces, exercises, infrastructure, and prepositioned equipment.[10] To reprise the U.S. role in European security, France would need to contribute as much as or more than the United States has.

France has worked to close the gap. Since rejoining NATO’s integrated military command in 2009, it has steadily increased its role in the command structure, and at the time of writing a French officer held the post of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. France also participates in other NATO and EU command structures, including the Eurocorps in Strasbourg and the French Rapid Reaction Corps in Lille.[11] By expanding its military capability, France is preparing to fill the void a U.S. withdrawal would leave.

Economic and military constraints

The economic cost of military leadership is the most serious threat to France’s broader goals. Taking on a larger share of NATO’s responsibilities would require sustained investment in defense modernization, which could strain an already fragile economy. The challenges include maintaining an economy strong enough to finance military renewal, winning public acceptance for higher defense spending, and persuading the rest of Europe to share the load.

France already spends 47 percent of its defense budget on personnel, and the cost of modernizing its nuclear arsenal was projected to rise from €3.9 billion in 2017 to €6 billion a year between 2020 and 2025.[12] Spending at that level means higher taxes or cuts to other priorities such as healthcare and pensions. France faces mounting debt and deficits: in September 2024, the head of the Court of Audit warned Parliament that the country would miss its deficit target and would need to find about €100 billion in savings over several years to comply with EU budget rules. France’s debt had grown to €3 trillion, more than 110 percent of GDP, the highest in Europe after Greece and Italy.[13] High debt makes it harder to borrow to grow the military when the economy alone cannot fund it.

To address this, the government considered taxing the wealthiest individuals and largest businesses, reversing a decision from Macron’s first term. Warning that France’s finances had worsened rapidly, then-Prime Minister Michel Barnier said, “I’m not going to raise taxes on all French people. But I cannot exclude the wealthiest and corporations from the national effort to rectify the situation.”[14] The proposal drew strong pushback from those who feared it would discourage investment. Budget Minister Amélie de Montchalin criticized a proposed 2% wealth tax, saying it would cause investment, entrepreneurship, and corporate growth to drop, which she called “not tolerable.”[15] France’s ambition to replace the United States as the guarantor of European security is limited by a struggling economy and by political division over how to fix it.

France’s other challenge is persuading European partners to contribute on equal terms. Most European countries do not treat European security as their primary objective, which shifts more of the burden onto France, and each needs public support at home to do more. Common strategic challenges also require the EU to increase its contribution to transatlantic security and to the defense of Europe.[16] As planned, French defense funding for 2019–2025 totaled €295 billion, with €198 billion allocated through 2023.[17] France’s budget alone cannot sustain collective European security as threats evolve, from cyberattacks to renewed Russian aggression. There has been growing pressure for allies to spend beyond the 2 percent benchmark given Russia’s war in Ukraine. The United States has long complained that Europe contributes too little to NATO; without the United States, France would have the same complaint about its allies.

France therefore faces both internal and external pressure. Internally, political division over the deficit means any solution requires sacrifices that no side wants to accept, and the likely tradeoff is higher taxes to fund military ambitions. Externally, the strategic review notes the return of military power in world politics, notably by Russia and China, and competition across sea, air, space, and cyberspace.[18] France must fund all of these domains to stay competitive.

Recommendations

Option 1: Formalize a Franco-German defense compact (bilateral, 1–3 years)

France should formalize and expand its defense partnership with Germany through a Franco-German Defense Compact that deepens long-standing cooperation and responds to new threats. The compact would build on Articles 3 and 4 of the 2019 Aachen Treaty, which commit both countries to cooperate on foreign policy, defense, external and internal security, and development, and would strengthen the efficiency, coherence, and credibility of Europe’s military capabilities.

Proposed actions

1. Accelerate development of the Next Generation Weapon System through binding commitments to shared procurement and deployment.[19]
2. Combine each country’s strengths: Germany’s economy and industrial base, including defense firms such as Rheinmetall and Diehl, and France’s nuclear arsenal, combat-ready forces, and permanent Security Council seat, including cooperation on upgrading French nuclear capabilities that would be costly for France to fund alone.

Type: A bilateral agreement within the complementary frameworks of the EU and NATO, supporting NATO’s collective defense role while strengthening EU-led strategic autonomy.

Pros

• Builds on existing treaty obligations and the political momentum of the Aachen Treaty.
• Sends a strong signal of European unity to adversaries such as Russia.
• Improves EU strategic autonomy by coordinating capability development.

Cons

• Germany’s historical reluctance to engage militarily could limit the compact’s effectiveness.
• Other EU member states could feel excluded, creating political tension within the EU.

Option 2: Deepen and expand the European Intervention Initiative (multilateral, within 2 years)

France should transform the European Intervention Initiative from a flexible, non-binding forum into an institutionalized, operational coalition of willing and capable European states. This would not create a European army or duplicate NATO. It would give Europe a framework to respond to crises on its own if NATO cannot act or the United States is absent.

Macron proposed EI2 in September 2017 as part of his vision for a sovereign, united, and democratic Europe. Today it is a flexible forum focused on strategic foresight and intelligence sharing, scenario development and planning, support to operations, and lessons learned and doctrine, with the goal of building a shared strategic culture that reinforces cooperation through NATO, the UN, and the EU.

Proposed actions

1. Create an EI2 intervention doctrine specifying deployment thresholds, rules of engagement, and operational criteria.
2. Establish an EI2 Cyber and Hybrid Threat Task Force focused on intelligence sharing and monitoring disinformation.

Pros

• Strengthens European autonomy while preserving NATO’s integrity.
• Enhances the credibility and operational capacity of French leadership.
• Offers a politically viable framework for acting with willing partners, including the United Kingdom after Brexit.

Cons

• Could create friction with members that see it as competing with initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or NATO readiness initiatives.
• Depends heavily on partners’ political will, and concerns about duplicating NATO and EU structures persist. Some in the UK also worry it could draw Britain into EU affairs through the back door.

Option 3: Raise French defense spending to 3% of GDP (unilateral, over 5–7 years)

France would increase its financial commitment to match U.S. leadership in NATO by raising its defense target from 2% to 3% of GDP, funding readiness, modernization, and sustainability.

Proposed actions

1. Commit to gradually reaching 3% of GDP by 2030.
2. Ramp up modernization of next-generation air, land, and space systems.

Pros

• Demonstrates France’s credibility and commitment to leading NATO without the United States.
• Increases France’s capacity to act independently and within alliances.
• Gives France more influence in NATO and EU burden-sharing debates.

Cons

• Likely public resistance, especially under economic pressure.
• Could divert funds from social programs or trigger fiscal backlash.

Conclusion: ranking the options

France has several ways to respond to the security burden a U.S. withdrawal would create, but the best choice must be both economically and politically viable to have lasting impact. Ranked from most to least viable:

1. Deepen and expand the European Intervention Initiative. This is the most attainable option. It fits existing European burden-sharing and leadership frameworks and offers a rapid-response mechanism for crises beyond NATO’s scope. It depends on partners’ political will, but it is low-cost and high-return, and it reinforces both EU and NATO goals.

2. Formalize a Franco-German defense compact. Germany is an essential partner, pairing its economic and industrial power with France’s nuclear deterrent, and the Aachen Treaty gives the compact legal and political weight. Possible German reluctance toward military action and the risk of alienating other EU states argue for caution.

3. Raise defense spending to 3% of GDP. This is the least feasible option in the near term. France’s debt, social tensions, and resistance to taxes would make a 3% commitment highly contentious, and more spending does not guarantee more capability without reform. It should remain a long-term objective if France intends to match U.S. leadership and remain a dependable pillar of European defense.